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Introduction 
The non-proliferation regime - comprising the 
legally established Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) and the non-legal Nuclear 
Supplier's Group (NSG), the Missile Technol-
ogy Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australia 
Group - has been in a state of crisis over the 
past year or so. Though most (if not all) of the 
ills of the regime were blamed squarely on the 
Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998, 
the reality is a little less dramatic and far more 
complex. Here I shall argue that crisis in the 
NPT was evident even before the tests and 
continued even after the negative fallout of the 
events in South Asia had been contained. While 
the events in South Asia did not deliver a fatal 
blow to the tethering nuclear non-proliferation 
regime and did not lead to the prospect of 
rampant proliferation, they did not leave the 
NPT regime unscathed either. They raised some 
fundamental challenges to the regime, but in 
some aspects they may also have had a positive 
impact on the regime. 
The impact of events in south Asia 
The Indian tests conducted on II and 13 May in 
Pokhran and the Pakistani blasts at Ras Koh on 
28 and 30 May 1999 raised three primary 
concerns. First, given the level of hostility 
between the two adversaries and the rudimen-
tary nature of the nuclear arsenals, there was 
fear that the region may become the flash point 
(accidental or deliberate) for a nuclear ex-
change. Secondly, there was concern that the 
tests may lead other countries that have re-
nounced either nuclear weapons or an overt 
nuclear posture both within and without the 
NPT to break out. Thirdly there was alarm that 
South Asia may have an adverse effect on other 
areas of regional tension, particularly the Middle 
East, if countries there were to acquire technol-
ogy from either of the two new nuclear weap-
ons states. 
In retrospect, however, these concerns 
I FS Info 5/99 
appear to have been overstated. As Gerry Segal 
aptly noted in a Newsweek article: "All sorts of 
terrible things were supposed to happen after 
last year's tests. None did".' Although there was 
a noticeable rise in the tension along the line of 
control (LoC) in Kashmir, leading up to the 
Kargil intrusion this year, it did not lead to a full-
fledged war. While the reasons behind the Kargil 
confrontation are far too intricate to go into 
here, it is important to note that both Islamabad 
and New Delhi learnt to manage the crisis and 
prevent a dangerous escalation (even though 
democracy in Pakistan may have become the 
hapless victim of this success). Similarly, while 
both India and Pakistan conducted missile tests 
to validate delivery systems for their nuclear 
weapons, it has not led to an open-ended arms 
race. Moreover, so far neither India nor Pakistan 
have manned, deployed or put their nuclear 
forces on hair-trigger alert and both are working 
on ways to develop a stable nuclear regime in 
the region. 
Similarly, the concern that the Indian and 
Pakistani tests provided an incentive for other 
states to break out of the non-proliferation norm 
is also exaggerated. Indeed, so far no state 
either within or outside the NPT regime has 
used the events of May 1998 as an excuse to go 
overtly nuclear. While both Iran and General 
Alexander Lebed, the Governor of the Russian 
province of Krasnoyarsk, cited events in South 
Asia as a rationale for their own nuclear aspira-
tions, this linkage is tenuous. Iran probably used 
the May events as a post-facto justification for 
the test-flight of the Shehab 3 missile in July 
1998 while Governor Lebed's threat to declare 
his province a nuclear weapon state in the same 
month was probably aimed more at taunting 
Moscow rather than at the NPT regime. On the 
contrary Brazil, another potential breakout state, 
ratified both the NPT and the CTBT after the 
South Asian tests. 
This is not to say that no state will break out 
of the regime in future. As we shall see a little 
later, there are several potential breakout states 
within the NPT system. Indeed, as the North 
Korean and Iraqi cases have shown, there will 
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be states that feel compelled to opt out or defy 
the regime but this compulsion has not been and 
is unlikely to be determined by the tests in South 
Asia 
Finally, despite suspicion that nuclear weap-
ons technology may spread from South Asia 
(particularly cash-strapped Pakistan) to other 
regions of tension, especially the Middle East 
under the convenient, if somewhat misleading 
label of the "Islamic Bomb", there is little 
evidence to suggest that there has been any 
such transaction so far. Although the unprec-
edented visit of a senior member of the Saudi 
royal family·to Pakistan's enrichment facility 
caused serious concern, it does not seem to 
have led to any transfer of sensitive material or 
technology. On the contrary, there is some 
evidence to support the contention that sensitive 
nuclear and missile technology was being 
supplied by at least two members of the NPT to 
Pakistan. However, there is no evidence of India 
either receiving or supplying sensitive nuclear 
and missile technology from or to anyone. 
This is not to say that the concerns following 
the tests were unfounded, but simply that for a 
number of reasons, including the concerted 
effort made by different actors at the national, 
regional and international level to manage the 
fallout of the nuclear tests in South Asia, these 
effects have been contained in the short-term. 
In reality, however, the potential negative impact 
of the tests may have been highlighted for a 
number of reasons. For instance, as we shall 
see later, the tests provided some of the notably 
errant Asian members of the NPT with the 
opportunity to distract attention from their own 
foibles. 
On the other hand the tests also served as a 
wake-up call for proponents of nuclear disarma-
ment. This was evident in the 9 June I 998 Joint 
Ministerial Declaration titled, "A Nuclear-
Weapons-Free World: the need for a new 
agenda" issued by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa 
and Sweden.' In the wake of the tests not only 
did the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT) 
negotiations get off the ground, but also both 
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India and Pakistan declared a unilateral morato-
rium on further tests and announced their 
intention to sign the CTBT. Interestingly, soon 
after its tests India also asked to be admitted 
into the NPT (albeit as a nuclear weapon state)-
curious behaviour for a country that has con-
sistently challenged the discriminatory nature of 
the Treaty. India also readily agreed to provide 
negative security guarantees for proposed 
nuclear weapon free zones in its vicinity.' But 
none of these moves were purely altruistic: they 
were aimed at acquiring de facto recognition of 
India as a nuclear weapon state. 
In the long-term, however, there is no doubt 
that the eleven nuclear tests (according to Indian 
and Pakistani officials) in South Asia posed a 
fundamental challenge to the existing nuclear 
global order in two ways. First, they revealed 
the most obvious contradiction in the NPT: its 
inability to manage proliferation once it had 
occurred. Designed primarily to prevent prolif-
eration among its members, the regime is ill 
equipped to deal with a situation when even one 
of its members proliferates, let alone when a 
non-member goes down the proliferation path. 
The tests in South Asia demonstrated that the 
NPT was unable or unwilling to recognise, 
accommodate or effectively deal with the new 
reality. Coupled with this the tests also high-
lighted another basic contradiction in the non-
proliferation regime: does it confer legitimacy on 
the declared nuclear weapon possessors? Or 
does the definition of "nuclear-weapon State", 
as Rebecca Johnson has argued, not "legitimise 
the possession of the weapons" but "impose 
particular obligations, including Article VI on 
nuclear disarmament"?' Non-proliferation purists 
would argue that Article VI of the NPT, which 
stipulates "a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective interna-
tional control", is applicable to all members and 
not just the non-nuclear weapon states. Here is 
the crux of the dilemma. While the majority of 
the non-nuclear weapon members of the NPT 
are clear that there cannot be any de facto or de 
jure recognition of nuclear weapon states either 
within or outside the NPT, the situation is more 
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complicated as far as the five nuclear weapon 
states within the NPT regime are concerned. 
They realise that the only way not to legitimise 
the status of India and Pakistan as nuclear 
weapon states is to de-legitimise all nuclear 
weapons - a prospect that none of them is 
willing to embrace at the moment. This, ironi-
cally, puts India and Pakistan on the same track 
as the other nuclear weapon states - keen on 
retaining their nuclear arsenals for a variety of 
reasons. Therefore the dilemma before the other 
nuclear weapon states is how to deny India 
entry into the exclusive club while preserving 
their own status. These issues would have been 
difficult to address at any time but they were 
thrust upon the regime at a time of severe crisis, 
making their impact even greater. 
The troubled non-proliferation re-
gime 
The crisis, which began after the indefinite 
extension of the NPT in 1995, became apparent 
at the multilateral, bilateral and unilateral levels 
by early 1998. The second NPT Preparatory 
Committee meeting was deadlocked by the time 
of the tests. Worse, many NPT members not 
only expressed dissatisfaction but also threat-
ened to withdraw if key concerns were not 
addressed before the NPT Review Conference 
in 2000. Similarly, the FMCT threatened to 
become a non-starter. With Iraq UNSCOM 
stumbling from crisis to crisis. Finally, the 
proliferation record of China, Iran and North 
Korea, all members of the NPT, was not above 
reproach in the months leading up to the tests. 
Even after the tests, several events raised 
serious questions about the ability of the regime 
to halt proliferation. These included the setback 
to the Middle East peace process; new revela-
tions of North Korea's nuclear weapons pro-
gramme; the non-ratification of the CTBT by 18 
of the 44 states stipulated in Article XIV of the 
treaty to enable its entry into force, including 
China, the United States and Russia; China's 
unfettered qualitative and quantitative advance-
ment of its nuclear weapons programme; the 
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problem of "loose nukes" in Russia; and the 
United States' decision to spend an additional 
$6.6 billion on a national missile defence pro-
gramme, thus effectively undermining the I 972 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. In sum the 
tests complicated the already difficult prolifera-
tion scenario in manifold ways. 
Even before India crashed into this exclusive 
club in May 1998, there were rumblings of 
discontent among the non-nuclear members 
against the selective application of provisions of 
the NPT by the nuclear members. Many non-
nuclear member states had agreed to the indefi-
nite extension of the NPT in 1995 on the condi-
tion that there would be visible progress on 
some issues during the course of the three 
preparatory committee meetings in the run-up to 
the year 2000 Review Conference. However, by 
the time ofthe Second PrepCom, which met 
from 27 April to 8 May I 998 in Geneva, the 
backtracking of the nuclear members over these 
issues disappointed key non-nuclear members. 
This became evident in the stalemate during the 
PrepCom, which failed to adopt a report. In the 
end, the participants in the PrepCom failed even 
to agree on the rules of procedure or back-
ground documentation for the 2000 Review 
Conference. This meeting collapsed because of 
two fundamental issues: first, the United States' 
refusal to discuss the creation of a WMD free 
zone (weapons of mass destruction) in the 
Middle East; and secondly, the collective opposi-
tion of the five nuclear weapon states to the 
South African and Canadian proposals for 
creating mechanisms to facilitate the progress of 
nuclear disarmament. 
This internal crisis was evident even after the 
nuclear tests. Although the Third PrepCom, 
which met from 10 to 21 May 1999 in New 
Y ark, did produce a report, it failed to send 
recommendations on substance to the 2000 
Review Conference. However, given last year's 
experience there was relief that the PrepCom 
had at least produced a document. Again the 
major stumbling blocks were the Middle East 
resolution and disarmament. In the former the 
sticking point was Egypt's demand that Israel be 
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specifically named while the US was unwilling 
to do so. As a compromise the US agreed to 
name Israel together with India, Pakistan and 
Cuba (all non-signatories to the NPT) in the call 
for universality but would not single out Israel 
in relation to the Middle East. Similarly although 
Britain, France, Russia and the US presented 
some report of their actions taken on article VI, 
they were not keen to discuss either present 
difficulties or future actions. Significantly, the 
US-led NATO action in Kosovo during the 
PrepCom was also seen by China, Russia and 
some non-aligned nations as adversely affecting 
the NPT. In fact, China publicly asked ifNA TO 
would have bombed Belgrade if Yugoslavia had 
nuclear weapons. 5 
Before the South Asian tests, the most 
serious challenge to the regime came from 
within when two non-nuclear member states, 
Iraq and North Korea attempted to "go nuclear". 
In both these cases the regime was found 
wanting in enforcing compliance. The Iraqi case 
is particularly sobering. Despite the military 
subjugation of Iraq and despite having a clear 
mandate from the world community (backed by 
several UN Security Council resolutions), 
UNSCOM was unable to effectively disarm 
Iraq's WMD programme, let alone enforce 
compliance. Ironically, in the last series of 
attacks by the United States and Britain on Iraq, 
although the bombs landed on Baghdad, they 
effectively destroyed UNSCOM. Since Decem-
ber 1998 UNSCOM has not carried out work in 
Iraq. It remains to be seen whether the inspec-
tors will go back to Iraq. The UNSCOM experi-
ence also raises doubts about the future pros-
pects of multilateral compliance regimes. 
Another country whose nuclear weapon 
programme and proliferation record has been a 
cause of anxiety to both the NPT and India is 
China. Indeed some in India claim that the 
motive behind New Delhi's weapon programme 
is China, which delivered a humiliating defeat to 
India in the 1962 border war, and still poses a 
direct and indirect threat to India. From New 
Delhi's point of view, Beijing's military build-up 
and its missiles reportedly located in Tibet 
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present a clear and present danger. China has 
consistently denied the presence of missiles in 
Tibet. The lack of transparency, however, 
makes it difficult to ascertain either the veracity 
of China's disclaimer or to accurately assess the 
extent of the threat India is faced with. 
The indirect Chinese threat posed to India is 
also a direct threat to the NPT regime. It is 
based on China's uninterrupted build-up and 
modernisation of its nuclear and missile arsenal; 
its supply of missile and nuclear technology to 
countries in India's neighbourhood, such as 
Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia; and its 
technical assistance in the nuclear and missile-
related area, particularly to Pakistan. The Sino-
Pakistan nexus has also been acknowledged by 
the United States. In his testimony before the 
US Congress in 1993, the then-Director of the 
CIA, James Woolsey, noted: 
Beijing has consistently regarded a nuclear-
armed Pakistan as a crucial regional ally 
and vital counterweight to India's growing 
military capabilities. [. . .] Beijing, prior to 
joining the NPT in 1992, probably provided 
some nuclear weapons-related assistance to 
Islamabad. 6 
Subsequent reports suggest that Beijing may 
have transferred an entire M- I I production plant 
to Pakistan, which is being built in the town of 
Fatehganj even after May 1992. In his testimony 
before a Senate Sub-Committee in Aprill997, 
the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Non-Proliferation, Robert Einhorn admitted that 
it was only in May 1996 that the United States 
was able to wrest an assurance from Beijing that 
it was indeed stopping supplies of critical 
technology for Pakistan's nuclear and missile 
programmes. In return China demanded (and 
got) advanced nuclear and satellite technology 
from the United States, thereby further eroding 
the already battered non-proliferation regime. 
Even after Pakistan's nuclear tests, China has 
not been held accountable for its role. Indeed, 
the tests have provided Beijing with an opportu-
nity to whitewash its past proliferation record 
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and to present itself before the world as a 
zealous guardian of the non-proliferation regime. 
Even if China did not contribute to the 
Pakistani programme, as Beijing vehemently 
claims, its own programme, however benign, 
has a direct bearing on the May 1998 events in 
South Asia. As Tariq Rauf has noted, the "di-
lemma in South Asia" is that "nuclear prolifera-
tion and nuclear security are inter-linked: Paki-
stan versus India, India versus China, China 
versus Russia, and Russia versus the United 
States."' This linkage is crucial because on the 
one hand it implies that as India's capabilities 
grow, China·may be compelled to respond. On 
the other hand, were China to enhance its 
nuclear capability to, say, counter the US ABM 
shield (as indeed they have threatened to do), 
then India may be forced to match the Chinese 
build-up. This in turn may lead Pakistan to 
increase its arsenal to counter a perceived Indian 
nuclear expansion. Therefore, the inverse 
linkage between non-compliance by NPT mem-
bers and proliferation in South Asia is equally 
important. 
If universality and compliance are the two 
major problems confronting the NPT, entry-
into-force is the major problem confronting the 
CTBT. When the treaty was opened for signa-
ture in September I 996, it was hoped that it 
would be signed and ratified by the 44 states 
mentioned in article XIV (these states were 
chosen because they all operate nuclear reac-
tors) and enter into force by September I 999. 
In this regard the nuclear tests of India and 
Pakistan actually paved the way for both of 
them to come on board the treaty, as both were 
able to validate their nuclear weapon capability. 
However, as noted earlier, by October 1999 only 
26 of the 44 states, (excluding China, Russia, 
the US. India, Pakistan and North Korea) had 
signed and ratified the treaty. According to the 
provisions of the treaty, if it did not enter into 
force by the stipulated date, a conference would 
be called comprising "the states that have 
already deposited their instruments of ratifica-
tion" to "decide by consensus what measures 
[ ... ] may be undertaken to accelerate the ratifi-
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cation process in order to facilitate the early 
entry into force of this Treaty". This conferenct< 
was held in Vienna from 6 to 8 October 1999. 
By all accounts the outcome of the confer-
ence was modest. Of the 154 states that had 
signed the CTBT only 92 attended. Four states 
that have not signed, including Pakistan, also 
attended. India and North Korea did not attend. 
With the intention of avoiding confrontation at 
the conference the deliberations were done 
weeks prior to the actual conference and the 
final statement was almost agreed to by the time 
of the conference. Instead of suggesting any 
radical steps or an alteration to the treaty that 
could be used by opponents to the treaty, the 
consensus final declaration, while calling for 
various actions to accelerate entry into force, 
did not name any country individually. Thus the 
declaration appealed to two non-signatory States 
[India and Pakistan] who had promised not to 
impede the Treaty and whose ratification was 
needed for the Treaty's entry into force to sign 
and ratify as soon as possible and to "refrain 
from acts which would defeat" the object and 
purpose of the treaty. Similarly, the Conference 
also noted the ratification by two nuclear 
weapon states and called on the remaining three 
who have signed but not ratified [China, Russia, 
the US] and whose ratification is needed for its 
entry into force to "accelerate their ratification 
processes with a view to their early successful 
conclusion".8 
Despite this polite appeal, the US Senate did 
not oblige and within days of the Conference it 
rejected ratification. The US rejection of the 
CTBT is particularly troubling, as it is one 
country that, clearly, has the wherewithal to 
sustain a credible and reliable nuclear arsenal 
even without testing. It is the one party that has 
the least to lose and the most to gain by ensur-
ing entry-into-force of the CTBT. Moreover, the 
rejection was inexplicable to analysts who 
thought that the Clinton administration had pre-
paid the price for ratification by setting up a 
well-funded Stockpile Stewardship programme 
and acquiescing to ballistic missile development. 
This rejection, if not reversed soon, would be 
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the fatal blow both to the Treaty and the US 
non-proliferation credentials. Although both 
Russia and China promised to put up the Treaty 
for ratification, it remains to be seen if they will 
follow through on their pledges. However, even 
if they do and India and Pakistan also oblige, the 
treaty is still unlikely to enter into force unless 
both the US and North Korea (which has not 
even declared its intention regarding the treaty) 
sign and ratify. 
The FMCT (or FMT as some prefer to call 
it) began its precarious life as a resolution on the 
"Prohibition of the production of fissile materi-
als for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explo-
sive devices" in December 1993. In March 
1995, just before the NPT Review and Exten-
sion Conference, the Conference on Disarma-
ment (CD) adopted a report agreeing to establish 
an ad hoc Committee to negotiate the proposed 
fissile materials ban. Several delegations, par-
ticularly Pakistan, Iran, Egypt and Algeria 
pushed hard to include existing stocks (the 
product of past production). The nuclear 
weapon states and India rejected attempts to 
address stocks, arguing that the UN resolution 
was for a ban only on future production, i.e. a 
cut-off. In view of these fundamentally different 
demands and perspectives, it was decided to set 
up a committee with a core-negotiating mandate 
based on the text of the 1993 UN resolution, but 
with an understanding that other issues, includ-
ing past production, could be raised in the 
context of the negotiations. But after the NPT 
Conference, if became impossible to convene 
the actual committee and start negotiations. 
From 1995 until now, the FMT issue has been 
blocked for two main causes: stocks and linkage 
with nuclear disarmament. Led by India, a 
number of non-aligned countries had been 
linking the commencement of FMT negotiations 
to concurrent negotiations on a timetable for 
nuclear disarmament, which the five nuclear 
weapon states refused to take seriously. The 
nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 
May paradoxically opened up new opportunities 
to shift the political logjam. Under pressure to 
make concessions, India indicated that it would 
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no longer insist on the linkage between a cut-off 
treaty and time-bound nuclear disarmament. 
Subsequently, after high level meetings with the 
United States, Pakistan announced to the CD on 
30 July I 998 that it would agree to the establish-
ment of a negotiating committee on the FMT. 
Although the negotiations are likely to be long 
drawn and complicated, their commencement 
was the direct result of the nuclear tests in 
South Asia. 
The FMT pre-negotiation, ironically was the 
only silver lining in the otherwise dismal record 
of the CD for the past three years. According to 
the September 1999 issues of the official news-
letter of the United Nations Department for 
Disarmament Affairs, the CD "never reached 
agreement on adoption of a programme of work 
for its 1999 session, and thus was not able to 
undertake substantive work."' 
In one of the most telling instances, accord-
ing to one observer, "there were talks about 
possible talks about talks on nuclear disarma-
ment and re-establishment of an ad hoc commit-
tee on preventing arms race in outer space", 
which came to nought." This was on account 
of the worsening relations between the US 
President and the Congress, leading Patricia 
Lewis, the Director of UNIDIR, to conclude 
that the "three-year deadlock in the CD owes as 
much to shifting goal posts in the US as it does 
to shifting sands in the Rajasthan desert". 11 
While the multilateral track of the regime was, 
clearly, offline, the bilateral tracks did not fare 
any better, with START II being stalled and 
START III proving to be a non-starter. The 
second-tier nuclear weapon states roundly 
rejected suggestions to consider negotiations 
regarding their arsenals. They also expressed 
reservations about de-alerting. 
While there was a setback to the non-prolif-
eration and disarmament regimes, there was a 
reaffirmation of the centrality of nuclear weap-
ons for defence by the nuclear weapon states 
and military alliances associated with them, 
thereby legitimising the possession of nuclear 
weapons. For instance, the Defence Reviews of 
both Britain and France, while supporting 
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smaller arsenals and making token gestures 
towards de-alerting, legitimise their possession 
of nuclear weapons and emphasise their own 
nuclear status. Similarly, by continuing and 
refining its first-use doctrine and linking it with 
other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) the 
United States is not only justifying the retention 
of its arsenal but is embarking on a self-sustain-
ing cycle of proliferation. The recent decision to 
build a national missile defence system is indica-
tive of this trend. On the other hand, Russia 
reflects a cruel paradox: the greater its institu-
tional and military weakness the greater is its 
dependence on nuclear weapons and its opposi-
tion to non-proliferation and disarmament. This 
is reflected in its new military doctrine, which 
also calls for greater reliance on nuclear weap-
ons and jettisons its no first use commitment. 
While the signs are that Russia is growing 
weaker, its nuclear neighbour China is not only 
building up and modernising its strategic force 
but is also refining its tactical nuclear arsenal. 
Not surprising the Tokyo Forum report 
issued in July I 999 warned that "the fabric of 
international security is showing signs of unrav-
elling" and that "unless concerted action is 
taken, and taken soon, to reverse these danger-
ous trends, non-proliferation and disarmament 
treaties could become hollow instruments"." 
Given this bleak forecast, what does the road 
ahead look like? 
The road ahead 
At this juncture it is possible to envisage three 
likely scenarios. The first is the preservation and 
strengthening of the current non-proliferation 
regime with the eventual disarmament of all 
weapons of mass destruction as the logical 
corollary. This is the path of what Patricia 
Lewis calls "constructive engagement". The 
second is the gradual emergence of a new 
nuclear order where the world would learn to 
accommodate and live with not five or even 
eight but possibly a dozen nuclear weapon states 
- recognised or otherwise. This is what Cana-
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da's Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy calls the 
state of "new nuclear realpolitik". The third 
possibility is the frightening prospect of global 
nuclear disorder and chaos. 
Constructive Engagement 
The report of the Tokyo Forum provides one of 
the best road maps for the path of constructive 
engagement. In an even handed approach it 
recognises the need for a "realistic dialogue" to 
"address underlying security concerns" and 
replacing both "outdated nuclear doctrines" and 
"artificial disarmament deadlines". Among its 
key I 7 recommendations are a call to create a 
permanent secretariat and consultative commis-
sion of the NPT to "deal with questions of 
compliance and to consider strengthening 
measures for the Treaty"; the need for a "pro-
gressive reduction and complete elimination of 
nuclear weapons"; the revitalise START and 
expand scope of nuclear reductions to include 
China, France and Britain;" zero nuclear weap-
ons on hair-trigger alert; and to revitalise the CD 
by doing away with the consensus rule which 
was causing "perpetual deadlock". 
Clearly, the majority of the international 
community would be in favour of constructive 
engagement. However, to ensure the success of 
constructive engagement the present situation 
will have to be addressed in the short, medium 
and long term at the unilateral, bilateral, regional 
and multilateral levels simultaneously. In the 
short and medium term the objective would be 
to preserve nuclear peace, reduce the danger of 
nuclear war and ensure in the first instance 
compliance of the members to the non-prolifera-
tion regime. During this period, efforts should 
also be made to engage and accommodate non-
NPT states, possibly through a parallel regime 
built around the CTBT, the FMCT and subse-
quently a nuclear weapon convention that calls 
for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. 
Apart from moves to reduce the nuclear 
dangers directly, the international community 
must also remain engaged with the primary 
cause behind the quest for nuclear weapons -
regional security considerations. In this context 
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special attention must be paid to Asia, particu-
larly the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast 
Asia, which have emerged as the most signifi-
cant area of proliferation concern. Only by 
directly addressing the regional security consid-
erations will it be possible to move towards the 
long-term objective of global nuclear disarma-
ment. 
However the question of implementation is a 
crucial one as the recommendations call for a 
greater level of cooperation between the existing 
nuclear weapon, non-nuclear weapon and new 
nuclear weapon states than exists at the mo-
ment. For instance, how does one convince 
both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states 
that are wedded to the current doctrines to take 
steps that de-legitimise or at least de-emphasise 
the role of nuclear weapons for their security? 
The Canadian-German proposal to consider a 
no-first use doctrine for NATO was one such 
attempt. Another way would be for one of the 
non-nuclear weapon states (preferably from 
within NATO) that is currently dependent on the 
US/NATO nuclear arsenal for its security (and 
may even retain US nuclear weapons on its soil) 
to voluntarily give up this umbrella. 
New Nuclear Realpolitik 
While the constructive engagement approach 
calls for the eventual elimination of nuclear 
weapons, the new nuclear realpolitik approach 
calls for ways to accommodate the new entrants 
with minimal changes in the existing global 
order. Here it is conceivable that the present 
nuclear weapon states may do a deal with the 
new nuclear weapon states using some compo-
nents of the non-proliferation regime, such as 
the CTBT and the FMT, to accommodate them 
while preventing new entrants into the order by 
strengthening the regime. This may be one of 
the reasons why nuclear weapon states like the 
US have continued their engagement with both 
India and Pakistan on nuclear issues. While this 
may be unacceptable to the non-nuclear weapon 
states, there is very little they can do under the 
present set of nuclear and security doctrines. In 
such a scenario, the nuclear weapon holdings 
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may stabilize at a lower level than at present but 
complete nuclear disarmament will remain a 
distant dream. 
Disorder and Chaos 
The worst case scenario is one where there is 
neither constructive engagement nor realpolitik 
accommodation and where every country or 
groups of countries pulls in different directions 
in an adversarial manner. Were the international 
community to waver in its commitment towards 
non-proliferation, arms-control and disarma-
ment, either through denial or inadequate en-
gagement of the key players at the bilateral, 
regional and global level, it would court nuclear 
disaster. Whether the world lives up to this 
onerous responsibility will become evident in the 
next few years. 
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